This work aims to address an open problem in data valuation literature concerning the efficient computation of Data Shapley for weighted $K$ nearest neighbor algorithm (WKNN-Shapley). By considering the accuracy of hard-label KNN with discretized weights as the utility function, we reframe the computation of WKNN-Shapley into a counting problem and introduce a quadratic-time algorithm, presenting a notable improvement from $O(N^K)$, the best result from existing literature. We develop a deterministic approximation algorithm that further improves computational efficiency while maintaining the key fairness properties of the Shapley value. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate WKNN-Shapley's computational efficiency and its superior performance in discerning data quality compared to its unweighted counterpart.

In a well-calibrated risk prediction model, the average predicted probability is close to the true event rate for any given subgroup. Such models are reliable across heterogeneous populations and satisfy strong notions of algorithmic fairness. However, the task of auditing a model for strong calibration is well-known to be difficult---particularly for machine learning (ML) algorithms---due to the sheer number of potential subgroups. As such, common practice is to only assess calibration with respect to a few predefined subgroups. Recent developments in goodness-of-fit testing offer potential solutions but are not designed for settings with weak signal or where the poorly calibrated subgroup is small, as they either overly subdivide the data or fail to divide the data at all. We introduce a new testing procedure based on the following insight: if we can reorder observations by their expected residuals, there should be a change in the association between the predicted and observed residuals along this sequence if a poorly calibrated subgroup exists. This lets us reframe the problem of calibration testing into one of changepoint detection, for which powerful methods already exist. We begin with introducing a sample-splitting procedure where a portion of the data is used to train a suite of candidate models for predicting the residual, and the remaining data are used to perform a score-based cumulative sum (CUSUM) test. To further improve power, we then extend this adaptive CUSUM test to incorporate cross-validation, while maintaining Type I error control under minimal assumptions. Compared to existing methods, the proposed procedure consistently achieved higher power in empirical analyses.

Mechanisms for generating differentially private synthetic data based on marginals and graphical models have been successful in a wide range of settings. However, one limitation of these methods is their inability to incorporate public data. Initializing a data generating model by pre-training on public data has shown to improve the quality of synthetic data, but this technique is not applicable when model structure is not determined a priori. We develop the mechanism JAM-PGM, which expands the adaptive measurements framework to jointly select between measuring public data and private data. This technique allows for public data to be included in a graphical-model-based mechanism. We show that JAM-PGM is able to outperform both publicly assisted and non publicly assisted synthetic data generation mechanisms even when the public data distribution is biased.

From the social sciences to machine learning, it is well documented that metrics do not always align with social welfare. In healthcare, Dranove et al. (2003) showed that publishing surgery mortality metrics actually harmed sicker patients by increasing provider selection behavior. Using a principal-agent model, we analyze the incentive misalignments that arise from such average treated outcome metrics, and show that the incentives driving treatment decisions would align with maximizing total patient welfare if the metrics (i) accounted for counterfactual untreated outcomes and (ii) considered total welfare instead of averaging over treated patients. Operationalizing this, we show how counterfactual metrics can be modified to behave reasonably in patient-facing ranking systems. Extending to realistic settings when providers observe more about patients than the regulatory agencies do, we bound the decay in performance by the degree of information asymmetry between principal and agent. In doing so, our model connects principal-agent information asymmetry with unobserved heterogeneity in causal inference.