Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching

Michael Curry · Uro Lyi · Tom Goldstein · John Dickerson

[ Abstract ]
Mon 28 Mar 10:15 a.m. PDT — 11:45 a.m. PDT


We propose a new architecture to approximately learn incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions from sampled valuations. Our architecture uses the Sinkhorn algorithm to perform a differentiable bipartite matching which allows the network to learn strategyproof revenue-maximizing mechanisms in settings not learnable by the previous RegretNet architecture. In particular, our architecture is able to learn mechanisms in settings without free disposal where each bidder must be allocated exactly some number of items. In experiments, we show our approach successfully recovers multiple known optimal mechanisms and high-revenue, low-regret mechanisms in larger settings where the optimal mechanism is unknown.

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