
Corruption Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback



Debmalya MandalUniversity of Warwick



Andi Nika MPI-SWS



Parameswaran Kamalruban Featurespace




Adish Singla MPI-SWS




Goran Radanovic MPI-SWS


AISTATS 2025




Completions



Completions



Completions



Completions

Preference: $y_1 > y_2$ if $r(x, y_1) > r(x, y_2)$

Preference Model

• Simplest Model: Bradley-Terry (BT) model

•
$$\Pr(y_1 > y_2 | x) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-(r(x, y_1) - r(x, y_2)))}$$
 [Contextual Bandits]

Preference Model

• Simplest Model: Bradley-Terry (BT) model

•
$$\Pr(y_1 > y_2 | x) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-(r(x, y_1) - r(x, y_2)))}$$
 [Contextual Bandits]

Reinforcement Learning Version [1]

Preference Model

• Simplest Model: Bradley-Terry (BT) model

•
$$Pr(y_1 > y_2 | x) = \frac{1}{1 + exp(-(r(x, y_1) - r(x, y_2)))}$$
 [Contextual Bandits]

Reinforcement Learning Version [1]

- Given pairs of trajectories (τ_1, τ_2) with
- $\tau_i = (s_1^i, a_1^i, \dots, s_H^i, a_H^i)$
- $\Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-(r(\tau_1) r(\tau_2)))}$

[1] Deep Reinforcement Learning from Human Preferences, Christiano et. al. (NIPS-2017)

RLHF Pipeline

Given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_1, \tau_2, \bullet)\}$

RLHF Pipeline

Given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_1, \tau_2, \bullet)\}$

Reward Estimation:

$$\widehat{r} \leftarrow \min_{r} \ell(r; \mathcal{D}) = \sum_{(\tau_1, \tau_2) \in \mathcal{D}} -\log \Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2 \mid r)$$

RLHF Pipeline

Given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_1, \tau_2, \bullet)\}$

Reward Estimation:

$$\widehat{r} \leftarrow \min_{r} \ell(r; \mathcal{D}) = \sum_{(\tau_1, \tau_2) \in \mathcal{D}} -\log \Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2 \mid r)$$

Policy Optimization:

$$\widehat{\pi} \leftarrow \max_{\pi} V^{\pi}(\widehat{r})$$
 [discounted sum of returns under \widehat{r}]

But where do we get the Datasets?

But where do we get the Datasets?

Public repositories:



Hugging Face

- Private datasets are collected through crowdsourcing
- Concerns: Inaccurate feedback, Subjective opinions [2], Manipulation by adversaries

[2] Whose Opinions do Language Models Reflect? Santurkar et. al. ICML-2023.

But where do we get the Datasets?

- Public repositories: Hugging Face
- Private datasets are collected through crowdsourcing
- Concerns: Inaccurate feedback, Subjective opinions [2], Manipulation by adversaries

• Huber Corruption Model: ε -fraction of the data is arbitrarily corrupted.

[2] Whose Opinions do Language Models Reflect? Santurkar et. al. ICML-2023.

• **Setup**: given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_w^i, \tau_\ell^i, o^i)\}_{i=1}^n$ according to reward r.

- **Setup**: given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_w^i, \tau_\ell^i, o^i)\}_{i=1}^n$ according to reward r.
- An adversary corrupts ε -fraction of the datapoints arbitrarily.

- **Setup**: given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_w^i, \tau_\ell^i, o^i)\}_{i=1}^n$ according to reward r.
- An adversary corrupts ε -fraction of the datapoints arbitrarily.
- An RLHF algorithm outputs policy $\hat{\pi}$

- Setup: given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_w^i, \tau_\ell^i, o^i)\}_{i=1}^n$ according to reward r.
- An adversary corrupts ε -fraction of the datapoints arbitrarily.
- An RLHF algorithm outputs policy $\hat{\pi}$
- We measure suboptimality gap $V^{\pi^*}(r) V^{\hat{\pi}}(r)$

- Setup: given a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\tau_w^i, \tau_\ell^i, o^i)\}_{i=1}^n$ according to reward r.
- An adversary corrupts ε -fraction of the datapoints arbitrarily.
- An RLHF algorithm outputs policy $\hat{\pi}$
- We measure suboptimality gap $V^{\pi^*}(r) V^{\hat{\pi}}(r)$

The problem is hard to solve without any assumption about the model.

• Linear MDP: reward and transition functions are linear in features. [3]

- Linear MDP: reward and transition functions are linear in features. [3]
- There exist reward parameters (unknown) $\{\theta_h\}_{h=1}^H$ s.t.

$$r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\mathsf{T}} \theta_h$$

- Linear MDP: reward and transition functions are linear in features. [3]
- There exist reward parameters (unknown) $\{\theta_h\}_{h=1}^H$ s.t.

$$r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\mathsf{T}} \theta_h$$

• There exist signed measures (unknown) $\{\mu_h\}_{h=1}^H$ s.t.

$$P_h(s'|s,a) = \phi(s,a)^{\mathsf{T}} \mu_h(s')$$

- Linear MDP: reward and transition functions are linear in features. [3]
- There exist reward parameters (unknown) $\{\theta_h\}_{h=1}^H$ s.t.

$$r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\mathsf{T}} \theta_h$$

• There exist signed measures (unknown) $\{\mu_h\}_{h=1}^H$ s.t.

$$P_h(s'|s,a) = \phi(s,a)^{\mathsf{T}} \mu_h(s')$$

• Offline RL: We need coverage assumption on the data.

[3] Provably Efficient RL with Linear Function Approximation, Jin, Wang, and Jordan, COLT-2020.

Results

Type of Coverage	Suboptimality Gap	#calls to Robust RL oracle
Uniform Coverage	$O\left(H^3\sqrt{d}\varepsilon^{1-o(1)}\right)$	O(1)
Low Relative Condition Number [4]	$\tilde{O}\left(H^2d^{3/4}\varepsilon^{1/4}\right)$	$\tilde{O}\left(\frac{H^{3/2}d^5}{\varepsilon^3}\right)$
Generalized Coverage Ratio [5]	$\tilde{O}\left(H^2d^{3/2}\sqrt{\varepsilon}\right)$	$O\left(\frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right)$

[4] Corruption-Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning, Zhang et. al. AlStats-2022.

[5] Offline Primal Dual RL for Linear MDPs, Gabbianelli et. al. AlStats-2024.

Corruption Robust RLHF

Corruption Robust RL [6]

(*E*-approx)

Corruption Robust RLHF

Corruption Robust RL [6] (€-approx)

1. Solve trimmed maximum likelihood estimation:

$$\widehat{\theta} \leftarrow \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad \underset{S \subseteq \mathcal{D}: |S| = (1 - \varepsilon)n}{\operatorname{max}} \quad \sum_{\tau_1, \tau_2 \in S} \log \Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2 \mid \theta)$$

Corruption Robust RLHF

Corruption Robust RL [6]

(€-approx)

1. Solve trimmed maximum likelihood estimation:

$$\widehat{\theta} \leftarrow \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad \underset{S \subseteq \mathcal{D}: |S| = (1 - \varepsilon)n}{\operatorname{max}} \quad \sum_{\tau_1, \tau_2 \in S} \log \Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2 \mid \theta)$$

2. Call oracle with $\hat{\theta}$ i.e. robust RL with rewards $r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\top} \hat{\theta}$.

Corruption Robust RLHF

Corruption Robust RL [6]

(*ε*-approx)

1. Solve trimmed maximum likelihood estimation:

$$\widehat{\theta} \leftarrow \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad \underset{S \subseteq \mathcal{D}: |S| = (1 - \varepsilon)n}{\operatorname{max}} \quad \sum_{\tau_1, \tau_2 \in S} \log \Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2 \mid \theta)$$

- 2. Call oracle with $\hat{\theta}$ i.e. robust RL with rewards $r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\top} \hat{\theta}$.
- Rationale: with uniform coverage $\|\hat{\theta} \theta^*\|_2 \le O(\varepsilon^{1-o(1)})$

Corruption Robust RLHF

Corruption Robust RL [6]

(€-approx)

1. Solve trimmed maximum likelihood estimation:

$$\widehat{\theta} \leftarrow \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} \quad \underset{S \subseteq \mathcal{D}: |S| = (1 - \varepsilon)n}{\operatorname{max}} \quad \sum_{\tau_1, \tau_2 \in S} \log \Pr(\tau_1 > \tau_2 \mid \theta)$$

- 2. Call oracle with $\hat{\theta}$ i.e. robust RL with rewards $r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\top} \hat{\theta}$.
- Rationale: with uniform coverage $\|\hat{\theta} \theta^*\|_2 \le O(\varepsilon^{1-o(1)})$
- Computational efficiency: Alternating optimization converges to a saddle point in $\tilde{O}(1/\varepsilon^2)$ iterations.

[6] Corruption-Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning, Zhang et. al. AlStats-2022.

Corruption Robust RLHF

Corruption Robust RL

 $(\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -approx)

Corruption Robust RLHF — Corruption Robust RL ($\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -approx)

Without uniform coverage,

$$\operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\widehat{\theta}, \mathcal{D}) - \operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\theta^{\star}, \mathcal{D}) \leq \widetilde{O}\left(H\sqrt{d\varepsilon} + d/n\right)$$

Corruption Robust RLHF — Corruption Robust RL ($\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -approx)

Without uniform coverage,

$$\operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\widehat{\theta}, \mathcal{D}) - \operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\theta^{\star}, \mathcal{D}) \leq \widetilde{O}\left(H\sqrt{d\varepsilon} + d/n\right)$$

• Construct a confidence set around $\hat{\theta}$, say $\Theta(\mathcal{D})$ (convex for Linear MDP).

Corruption Robust RLHF — Corruption Robust RL ($\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -approx)

Without uniform coverage,

$$\operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\widehat{\theta}, \mathcal{D}) - \operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\theta^{\star}, \mathcal{D}) \leq \widetilde{O}\left(H\sqrt{d\varepsilon} + d/n\right)$$

- Construct a confidence set around $\hat{\theta}$, say $\Theta(\mathcal{D})$ (convex for Linear MDP).
 - 2. Solve $\theta^{\dagger} \leftarrow \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta \in \Theta(\mathcal{D})} \max_{\pi} V^{\pi}(\theta)$ [Pessimistic Planning]

Corruption Robust RLHF —— Corruption Robust RL ($\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -approx)

· Without uniform coverage,

$$\operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\widehat{\theta}, \mathcal{D}) - \operatorname{Log-Likelihood}(\theta^{\star}, \mathcal{D}) \leq \widetilde{O}\left(H\sqrt{d\varepsilon} + d/n\right)$$

- Construct a confidence set around $\hat{\theta}$, say $\Theta(\mathcal{D})$ (convex for Linear MDP).
- 2. Solve $\theta^{\dagger} \leftarrow \operatorname{argmin}_{\theta \in \Theta(\mathcal{D})} \max_{\pi} V^{\pi}(\theta)$ [Pessimistic Planning]
- 3. Call oracle with θ^{\dagger} i.e. robust RL with rewards $r_h(s, a) = \phi(s, a)^{\top} \theta^{\dagger}$.

Solving $\min_{\theta \in \Theta(\mathcal{D})} \max_{\pi} V^{\pi}(\theta)$ [convex optimization]

Solve convex optimization with

- Solve convex optimization with
 - 1. Zero-order (noisy) oracle

Solving $\min_{\theta \in \Theta(\mathcal{D})} \quad \max_{\pi} V^{\pi}(\theta)$ [convex optimization]

- Solve convex optimization with
 - 1. Zero-order (noisy) oracle
 - (a) Use robust RL oracle calls to construct sub-gradient

- Solve convex optimization with
 - 1. Zero-order (noisy) oracle
 - (a) Use robust RL oracle calls to construct sub-gradient
 - (b) Each call is $\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -biased $\Rightarrow \varepsilon^{1/4}$ sub-optimality gap

- Solve convex optimization with
 - 1. Zero-order (noisy) oracle
 - (a) Use robust RL oracle calls to construct sub-gradient
 - (b) Each call is $\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -biased $\Rightarrow \varepsilon^{1/4}$ sub-optimality gap
 - 2. First-order (noisy) oracle

- Solve convex optimization with
 - 1. Zero-order (noisy) oracle
 - (a) Use robust RL oracle calls to construct sub-gradient
 - (b) Each call is $\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -biased $\Rightarrow \varepsilon^{1/4}$ sub-optimality gap
 - 2. First-order (noisy) oracle
 - (a) We use LP-based method to construct new robust RL oracle that returns $\sqrt{\varepsilon}$ -apx sub-gradient $\Rightarrow \sqrt{\varepsilon}$ sub-optimality gap

• We provide corruption-robust RLHF under various coverage assumptions.

• We provide corruption-robust RLHF under various coverage assumptions.

- Some directions for future work:
 - 1. Corruption-robustness with general reward models
 - 2. Online learning setting

• We provide corruption-robust RLHF under various coverage assumptions.

- Some directions for future work:
 - 1. Corruption-robustness with general reward models
 - 2. Online learning setting

Thank you!